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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
or both. These issues and whether the threats actually existed will
have to be decided by the jury on re-trial 5 The court of appeals de-
cision properly gives the appellant the opportunity to make its claim
before a jury. In addition, and in all fairness, whether the appellee
acted in good faith, though mistaken, in making its demand and to
what extent such a good faith but mistaken belief should negate the
wrongfulness of the threat, should also be considered.6 6 Whatever the
result, Jamestown Farmers Elevator shows that each case in which
economic duress is alleged must be decided on its facts, and no pre-
diction can be made of the result in any particular case.67
RICHARD GEIGER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF
A DRIVER'S LICENSE WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING DEEMED CONSTITU-
TIONALLY ADEQUATE
Plaintiff's driver's license was revoked, without preliminary hear-
ing, under an Illinois statute' which provided for such suspension
or revocation upon a showing that the driver had been repeatedly
convicted of traffic offenses indicating either an inability to exercise
ordinary and reasonable care in operating a motor vehicle or dis-
respect for the traffic laws and safety of other persons upon the
highway. Plaintiff2 made no request for an administrative hearing,
65. 552 F.2d at 1291.
66. The court stated as follows: "We recognize that good faith Insistence upon a legal
right which one believes he has usually is not duress, even if it turns out that that party
Is mistaken and, In fact, has no such right." Id. at 1290. It can certainly be argued that
the court of appeals did not give enough consideration to appellee's good faith belief that
It had a right to demand shipment of the grain.
67. SeC 13 \\. JAEGER, WII.LISTO ON CONTILACTS § 1613 (3d ed. 1970).
1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 951/2, 6-206(a,) (3) (1971) provides as follows:
(a)The Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the license or
permit of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing by his
records or other sufficient evidence that such person:
3. Has been repeatedly Involved as a driver in motor vehicle collisions or
has been repeatedly convicted of offenses against laws and ordinances regu-
latirg the movement oZ traffic, to a degree which indicates lack of ability
to exercise ordinary and reasonable care In the safe operation of a motor
vehicle or disrespect for the traffic laws and the safety of other persons
upon the highway ...
2. Plaintiff was a resident of Chicago, employed as a truck driver. His license was
suspend ed in November 1969 as a result of his having been convicted of traffic offenses
three times within a twelve-month period. He was later convicted for driving while his
license was suspended and consequently another suspension was Imposed in March 1970.
Hoe received no further citations until August 1974, when he was arrested on two separate
occasions for speeding. After having been convicted on both charges, he received a third
speeding citation in February 1975. On March 27, 1975, he was notified by letter that his
driving privil,'.ze- would cease if he was convicted of a third offense. On March 31, 1975,
he was convicted on the third charge. On June 3, 1975, plaintiff received notice of revoca-
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as provided for by statute," and instead filed a class action suit4
challenging the constitutionality of the statute under which his li-
cense had been revoked. 5 A three-judge federal district court granted
judgment for the plaintiff, holding that a license could not be sus-
pended or revoked until after a hearing had been held to determine
whether the licensee met the statutory criteria for suspension or rev-
ocation.6 On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed and held that the Illinois statute was constitutionally adequate
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Dixon
v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
The question of the necessity of a hearing prior to the suspen-
sion7 or revocation" of a driver's license has long been a dilemma
for the courts. Being largely controlled by statute, regulations in the
past that did not provide for a prior hearing were generally sus-
tained despite due process objections. But in 1971, in Bell v. Bur-
son,10 the United States Supreme Court added a new dimension to
this constitutional issue.
In Bell, the Court was faced with Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safe-
ty Responsibility Act,"' under which the license of an uninsured mo-
torist involved in an accident was to be suspended unless he posted
security to cover the amount of damages claimed by the aggrieved
parties in the reports of the accident. 12 The Court held that before
the state could deprive the motorist of his driver's license, it had to
tion effective June 6, 1975. A class action was filed on June 5, 1975, pursuant to Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all persons licensed to operate mo-
tor vehicles by the State of Illinois and whose licenses are subject to revocation pursuant
to statute. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1977).
3. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95V2, § 6-206(c) (2) (1971).
4. The class was never certified. 431 U.S. at 111 n.9.
5. See supra note 1.
6. Love v. Howlett, No. 75-C 1821 (N.D. Ill., decided January 20, 1976).
7. Where a suspension occurs, the state generally permits reinstatement of the privi-
lege to drive a motor vehicle. People v. Suddoth, 52 Ill. App. 2d 355, 202 N.E.2d 120, 123
(1964). Revocation, on the other hand, requires the issuance of a new license. Id.
8. Revocation is defined as the involuntary termination of the driving privilege of a
person and is a penalty imposed for purposes of discipline and public protection. Hamilton
v. Dick, 254 Cal. Aup. 2d 123, - , 61 Cal. Rptr. 894, S96 (1967). See 60 C.J.S. Motor Ve-
hicles § 164.1 (1969).
Generally, the suspension or revocation of a driver's license is not intended as a
punishment to the driver, but is meant to protect the public. This scheme often, Is one of
the most effective measures to compel observance of the traffic laws. 7 AM. JUR. 2d
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 109 (1963).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-23 (1972), defines suspension and revocation as follows:
1. Suspension means that the driver's license and privilege to drive a motor
vehicle on the public highways are temporarily withdrawn but only during
the period of such suspension.
2. Revocation means that the driver's license and privilege to drive a motor
vehicle on the public highways are terminated and shall not be renewed or
restored, except that an application for a new license may be presented and
acted upon by the commissioner after the expiration of the period of revo-
cation, which period shall not be less than thirty days nor more than one
year.
9. See Jones v. Kirkman, 138 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1962): Spurbeck v. Statton, 252 Iowa
279, 106 N.W.2d 660 (1960) ;Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967).
10. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
11. GA. CODE ANN. ch. 92A-6 (1972) (repealed 1977).
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-605(a) (Supp. 1970). 402 U.S. at 516.
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provide a forum to determine whether there was a reasonable pos-
sibility of a judgment being rendered against the motorist as a re-
sult of the accident.'8 In deciding that the suspension of a license
without the benefit of a hearing on fault was a denial of procedural
due process, the Court said that once licenses are issued, their con-
tinued possession becomes essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
The Court added that the suspension of licenses involves state action
and that licenses are not to be taken away without procedural due
process as required by the fourteenth amendment. 1'4 Furthermore,
the Court declared that constitutional restraints limit state power
to terminate an entitlement, whether the entitlement is called a
"right" or a "privilege.' '
The Court in Bell rejected Georgia's argument that if the state
must provide the licensee with a hearing to determine the question
of liability, such a hearing need not be held prior to the suspension
of the license. 6 The Court stated that except in emergency situa-
tions, 17 due process requires a state to afford notice and the oppor-
tunity for a meaningful1 8 hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case 9 before the termination becomes effective. 20
The application of Bell is clear with respect to financial respon-
sibility laws2' because the decision specifically dealt with Georgia's
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.2 2 But Bell has also received
considerable attention in cases concerning suspension or revoca-
13. 402 U.S. at 542.
14. Id. at 539, ctiOng Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) and Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). These words lead one to cQnclude that possession of
a license, being within the scope of the protection afforded by the due process clause, Is
indeed a property right once the license has been issued, and it remains such until its
expiration date so long as the laws pertaining to its use are obeyed.
15. 402 U.S. at 539. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (disqualification
for unemployment compensation); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (denial of a
tax exemption); Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (discharge frory)
public employment). See also Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941);
Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S.
373 (1908).
16. 402 U.S. at 542.
17. The situation in Bell was not deemed an emergency situation. Id. An emergency
situation, however, was deemed to exist in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 59
(1950) (multiple seizures of misbranded goods under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act) and Fahey v. 'allonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (the appointment of a con-
servator to take possession of a federal savings and loan association).
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that the public interest In removing an
offender from the highways outweighs the individual's right to a hearing. So where the
defendant's record depicts frequent driving violations, a hearing is not required in order
to comply with the requirements of due process prior to suspension. A record of frequent
driving violations constitutes an emergency under the Bell decision. State v. Sinner, 207
N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1973). See also Cox v. HJelle, 207 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1973) ; Kosmatka
v. Safety Respon. Div. of N.D. State Hwy. Dept., 196 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1972).
18. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). A meaningful hearing is one
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. Due process requires no.
tice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to any deprivation of life, liberty, or properly.
Id. at 550.
19. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
20. 402 U.S. at 542.
21. For North Dakota's financial responsibility law, see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-16
(1972).
22. See supra notes 11 & 12.
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tion of a driver's license following a conviction for certain offenses.
23
The rationale for requiring due process in hearings involving
the revocation or suspension of a driver's license is generally found-
ed on the principle that the particular private interest is a prop-
erty interest within the protection of the due process clause.
2 4
Government benefits deemed not to be property interests, such as
an interest in the use of public parks and highways, are privileges
which may be terminated without due process objections.2 5
The prevailing view in the courts across the country is that a
license to operate a motor vehicle is indeed a property right,2 6 and
due process applies to the deprivation of a driver's license by a
state.2 7 The question of what sort of procedural due process is re-
quired still remains, however.
To determine the requirements of procedural due process for the
suspension of a right or privilege, it is helpful to look at the fac-
tors considered in Goldberg v. Kelly,2 8 a case concerning the ter-
mination of welfare benefits by the State of New York. The state in
Goldberg contended that it had complied fully with procedural due
process by providing for a pretermination "review" and a post-ter-
23. E.g., Nusberger v. Wisconsin Div. of Motor Vehicles, 352 F. Supp. 515 (W.D. Wis.
1973); Warner v. Trombetta, 348 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd 410 U.S. 919
(1972); Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W.2d 218 (1972), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 972 (1972) ; Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Bradley, 503 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. 1973).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part as follows: -[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See infra
note 28.
25. For an exhaustive look at the doctrine of privilege and Its effect on the application
of due process, see K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 246-54 (1951).
The typical thinking is that no one has a right to a government gratuity, ani
therefore no one should be entitled to a hearing. The operation of a motor vehicle on, pub-
lic highways is not a right, but is a mere conditional privilege. Due process protects only
"life, liberty, and property," and not privileges. Courts need not require. fair hearings
when nothing more than privileges are at stake. Id. at 250. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ; United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). See also Retch, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
26. Ross v. Gunarls, 395 F. Supp. 623 (D. Mass. 1975); Hart Twin Volvo Corp. v.
Comm'r Pf Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 42, 327 A.2d 588 (1973); Seufert v. Tofany, 13
App. Div. 2d 890, 352 N:Y.S.2d 70 (1974); People v. Rodriguez, 8 Misc. 2d 1060, 364
N.Y.S.2d 786 (1975).
27. Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1973); Pollard v. Panora, 411 F. Supp. 580
(D. Mass. 1976); Barnes v. Armour, 892 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Jones V.
Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Earnhart v. Heath, 369 F. Supp. 259 (E.D.
Ark. 1974.) ; Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973) ; Reese v. Kassab, 334 F.
Supp. 744 (W.D. Penn. 1971) ; Pollion v. Lewis, 320 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ill. 1970), vacated,
403 U.S. 902 (1971), on remand, 332 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. 111. 1971) ; Pope v. Cokinos, 232
Ga. 425, 207 S.E.2d 63 (1974); Hurt v. Austin, 42 Mich. App. 2d 554, 202 N.W.2d 554
(1972); In re Arndt, 67 N.J. 432, 341 A.2d 596 (1975); State v. Wenof, 102 N.J. Super.
370, 246 A.2d 59 (1968); Dow v. Tofany, 29 App. Div. 2d 901, 287 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1969);
Fell v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 30 Ohio App. 2d 151, 283 N.E.2d 825 (1972); State v.
Scheffel, 82 Wash. 2d 872, 514 P.2d 1052 (1973). But see Scott v. Hill, 407 F. Supp. 301
(E.D. Va. 1976) (loss of an operator's license does not constitute a loss of a liberty):
Dept. of Highway Safety Motor Vehicles v. Argeros, 313 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1975)
(failure to provide an individual, who has accumulated a sufficient number of points
to warrant suspension of his driv er's license, with notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to suspension of the license does not deprive him of procedural due process) ; Robert-
son v. State, 501 P.2d 1099 (Okla. 1972) (driver's license was not a property right in the
constitutional sense and therefore its revocation does not constitute the taking of property).
28. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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mination "fair hearing. ' ' 29 The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
and held that under all circumstances due process requires an ade-
quate hearing before termination of the benefits. A later hearing,
even though constitutionally adequate, will not suffice.30 The Court
went on to particularize the essential elements of procedural due
process as follows: (1) timely and adequate notice of the reasons
for termination; 31 (2) an effective opportunity to defend by con-
fronting adverse witnesses with oral arguments and evidence;3 2
(3) disclosure of the evidence to prove the state's case; 3 (4) the
right to be heard by counsel retained by the recipient; 4 (5) a de-
cision resting solely on the evidence brought forth at the hearing;33
and (6) an impartial decision-maker . 3
In attempting to determine the extent to which these procedural
due process requirements are necessary in a hearing prior to the
suspension or revocation of a driver's license, the Court in Dixon
v. Love applied a balancing test.3 7 As in any analysis of a purported
deprivation of procedural due process, the particular private and
governmental interests involved must first be identified and then
the relative importance of these interests must be weighed.38 In
Dixon,39 the Court identified a driver's license as a property inter-
est to which the due process clause applies. The Court then went
on to weigh the importance of that interest and the governmental
interests involved by considering three distinct factors: first, the
private interest that will be affected; second, the risk of an erron-
eous deprivation of such interest through the procedure used, and
the value of other procedural safeguards; and third, the govern-
ment's interest, as well as fiscal and administrative burdens that
additional procedures would entail.40
Taking into account these considerations, the Court concluded
as follows: (1) the private interest in a license to operate a motor
vehicle is not so great that an evidentiary hearing is required prior
to adverse administrative action;41 (2) the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation in the absence of a prior hearing is not great; 42 and (3)
the public interest in administrative efficiency and particularly in
29. Id. at 258-59.
30. Id. at 261,
31. Id. at 267-68.
32. Id. at 268.
33. Id. at 270.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 271.
36. Id.
37. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113-15 (1977).
SS. Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See Board of Regents
v. Roth, 4,08 U.S. 564. 570 (1972), where the Court stated that a weighing process has
always been vital in de;e-mining the form of hearing required by procedural due process.
39. 431 U.S. at 112-13.
40. Id., citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
41. Id. at 113.
42. Id.
RECENT CASES
highway safety and the prompt removal of a safety hazard is suffi-
cient to make the state's summary initial decision effective with-
out a pre-decision administrative hearing.4 3
North Dakota has taken a different approach to this perplexing
area than has the United States Supreme Court, and has afforded
the operator of a motor vehicle much more protection than the Su-
preme Court seemingly requires."
Prior to 1971 and the Bell decision, North Dakota provided for
suspension of a driver's license without a preliminary hearing. 45
The legislature, in 1973, amended the applicable statute to provide
for a hearing before the termination became effective. 46 Recently,
the legislature enacted a new statute that particularizes the details
of the pre-suspension hearing and further protects the interests of
the individual.4 7
The Supreme Court ostensibly indicated that procedural due proc-
ess in the administrative setting does not always require a strict
application of the necessary requirements. 4 Furthermore, the Court
asserted that an ad hoc approach would reduce the fairness of the
system because it would require a subjective inquiry in each case,
whereas objective rules provide all drivers with notice of any sanc-
tioned conduct. 49 Due process, like fairness, is not an absolute con-
cept. There are some extraordinary situations where constitutional
protections must be temporarily suspended, but the rarity of these
instances is well shown by the terms used by the Court to describe
them.50 Reconciling due process and highway safety may not be a
difficult task.51 States ought to recognize the serious consequences
that flow from a license suspension or revocation and offer mean-
ingful opportunities for licensees to contest prior to a proposed sus-
43. Id. at 114.
44. Id. at 115.
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-3? (1972).
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-32 (Supp. 1977) now provides that "[tihe commissioner
may suspend the license of an operator, after hearing .. " (emphasis added).
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-33 (Supp. 1977). Note that this statute even goes so far as
to provide for a reexamination of the licensee in the event a suspension Is ordered. Id.
48. 431 U.S. at 115 (1977). For a summary of the necessary requirements, see supra
notes 31-36, inclusive, and the accompanying text.
49. Id.
50. The Court has used such terms as: "rare and extraordinary," Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 5641, 570 (1972) ; "truly unusual," Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972) ;
"emnergency situations," Bell V. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); "extraordinary situa-
tions," Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
51. Several states have recognized the fact that drivers who are a hazard to the public
safety cannot be cured merely by suspending or revoking their licenses. These states pro-
vide a variety of methods to comport with the requirements of procedural due process.
Some states require a full evidentiary hearing prior to suspension or revocation of the
license, such as California, CAL. VER. CODE § 13950 (West 1971), Colorado, COLO. REv.
STAT. § 42-2-123(1)(d) (1973), Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.40 (1977), and Texas,
TEX. VEH . CODE ANN. tit. 6687b, § 31 (Vernon 1977). Other states, such as Virginia, VA.
CODE § 4.6.1-431 (1974), have required that the driver he given a. detailel notice of the rea-
son(s) for the suspension or revocation, the evidence used to support the determination.
and a sufficient time within which to request a hearing. Furthermore, the states of Ken-
tucky and Washington have gone so far as to provide for counseling and rehabilitation
for the driver prior to suspension or revocation.
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pension or revocation. 52 Not until the driver is afforded such a mean-
ingful opportunity will the essentials of procedural due process ac-
tually be attained.5 3
DANIEL L. HOVLAND
NEGLIGENCE-OCCUPIERS OF LAND-LAND OCCUPIER HAS A DUTY TO
BOTH INVITEES AND LICENSEES TO ACT AS A REASONABLE MAN
Plaintiff, an insurance agent, brought an action for damages suf-
fered when' she was bitten by defendant's dog. Plaintiff had gone
uninvited to defendant's farm to try to sell an insurance policy. De-
fendant was not home at the time. As plaintiff was walking to the
front door, the dog rushed out of the house, chased her back toward
the car, and bit her on the leg.1 The district court concluded that
plaintiff was a bare licensee on the premises and therefore defendant
owed her no duty other than not to harm her willfully or wantonly.
The court found no such wi!lfullness or wantonness by defendant 2 and
dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, the North
Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court and
held that the status of the person entering the premises is no longer
the sole factor to be used in determining liability and that the oc-
cupier 3 has a duty to act as a reasonable person in maintaining his
property in a reasonably safe condition for both invitees and licen-
sees.4 O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977).
Liability for negligence is generally based upon whether the
52. In both Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), the Court was careful to point out the serious economic hardships of suspension..
In both cases It appears that the Court was cognizant of the relative importance of both
state an1 Individual Interests.
53. The necessity of notice and hearing Is only one of many possible legal Issues that
may arise on appeal from a suspension or revocation, of a driver's license. The reader's
attention Is accordingly called to several annotations concerning the suspension or revo-
cation of a driver's license on various grounds: Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 452 (1971) (physical
disease or defect) ; Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 756 (1966) (habitual, persistent, or frequent vio-
lations of traffic laws); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3rd 690 (1966) (accumulation of a sufficient
number of points under a point system) ; Annot., q8 A.L.R.2d 1064 (1963) (refusal to take
an Intoxication test) :Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 612 (1964), Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 1019 (1963) and
Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 866 (1961) (convictions of motor vehicle offenses). The reader's
attention Is also called to an annotation concerning the validity of financial responsibility
laws, Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1011 (1954). See also Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25, 26
(1971), where the Court declared that there was plainly a susbstantial question whether the
Utah statutory scheme for the suspension of licenses under a financial responsibility law,
on its face, afforded the procedural due process required by Bell.
1. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 747-48 (N.D. 1977).
2. Id. at 748.
S. In this comment the term "occupier" shall mean occupier, owner, possessor, or
anyone who has control of the premises.
4. 251 N.W.2d at 752.
